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Reaching high levels of artistic creation in a society re-
quires institutions that facilitate the sorting of the most 
talented individuals of each generation and the develop-
ment of their skills across artistic careers. This working 
paper takes a professional career approach to analyzing 
how copyright regulation affects artistic creation. It builds 
an overlapping-generations model of artists in which the 
number and average talent of senior artists in each period 
is linked to the number of young artists in previous peri-
ods. Long copyrights increase superstar market concentra-
tion and can reduce the number of young artists who are 
able to pursue artistic careers. As a result, in the long run, 
excessively long copyrights can reduce artistic creation, 
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El mantenimiento de elevados niveles de creación artística 
en una sociedad requiere de un marco institucional que 
facilite el descubrimiento de los mejores talentos de cada 
generación y el desarrollo de sus cualidades a lo largo de 
carreras artísticas. Este documento de trabajo examina la 
influencia que tiene la regulación de los derechos de propie-
dad sobre la creación artística en cuanto a cómo esa regula-
ción afecta a las carreras artísticas. Se construye un modelo 
de generaciones solapadas de artistas en el que el número y 
talento de los artistas consagrados recogidos en cada período 
está ligado al número de artistas jóvenes en los períodos 
previos. Los derechos de autor en vigencia durante un tiem-
po más prolongado aumentan la concentración del mercado 
en favor de las grandes estrellas y pueden reducir el número 
de jóvenes artistas que son capaces de iniciar y desarrollar 
una carrera artística. Como consecuencia de ello, en el largo 
plazo, los derechos de autor excesivamente largos pueden 
reducir la creación artística, el talento medio de los artistas 
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NEW technologies as well as market globalization are profoundly affecting artistic markets. 
Partly as a result of this, intellectual property regulation is undergoing important changes in 
many countries. For instance, the copyright term has been extended in the US from 50 to 70 
years after the death of the creator, while the European Commission is considering an exten-
sion of the copyright term from 50 to 90 years. These changes are taking place amid an in-
tense popular and academic debate about how intellectual property should be adapted to 
changes in the economic and technological environment to better serve the public
1. 
This paper provides a new approach to the analysis of the long-run link between in-
tellectual property and artistic creation. The approach is based on a professional-career per-
spective of the determinants of artistic creation. Artistic creation is intensive in a unique 
input, talent, which is rare and can only be recognized and developed after the potentially 
talented artist has actually started the professional activity. Reaching high levels of artistic 
creation requires testing many artists every generation so as to sort the most talented. In the 
long run, artistic creation depends on how attractive to potential young artists this highly 
uncertain professional career is. Within this perspective, this paper builds an overlapping-
generations model of artists with three features: (i) the number and average talent of senior 
artists in a given period is linked to the number of young artists starting the career in previ-
ous periods; (ii) artistic markets are superstar markets; iii) promotion and marketing expen-
ditures play an important role in determining market shares. This approach provides new 
important insights on the long-run link between copyrights and artistic creation. Specifically, 
it shows that excessively long copyrights can boost superstars’ market share at the expense 
of the opportunities for young artists to start an artistic career. This in turn reduces artistic 
creation and the average talent of senior artists in the long run. 
                                                  
1 For example, the proposed extension of the copyright term in the European Union has been labeled 
as “a redistribution of income from living to dead artists” (Kretschmer et al. 2009). See Akerloff et al. 
(2002) and Liebowitz and Margolis (2003) for different positions on the optimality of the last exten-
sion of the copyright term in the US; Kretschmer et al. (2008) for discussion of the proposed exten-
sion in the European Union; Grossman and Lai (2004) and Boldrin and Levine (2006) on the debate 
on how that length should be changed as market size increases; Peitz and Waelbroeck (2005) and 
Varian (2005) for surveys; and The Economist October 11th 2007 and April 9th 2010 for some ac-






As indicated, the first feature emphasized by our analysis is the positive link between 
high-quality artistic creation by senior artists at a given moment in time and the number of 
young artists that were able to initiate an artistic career in previous periods. Much of the 
process of sorting and developing innate individual abilities is carried out through the period 
of formal education. However, some abilities cannot be ascertained without the individual 
actually performing the professional activity (Johnson, 1978). This is the case of artists. 
Young artists need time and some share of the market to test themselves and to develop their 
skills. Similarly, the market (promotion firms and consumers) needs time to test and sort real 
talent (MacDonald 1988). This gives rise to a positive dynamic link between the current 
abundance of young artists (most of whom will not succeed) and the future number and av-
erage talent of senior artists
2. 
The second characteristic of artistic markets featured in our analysis is the huge dif-
ference in market share and earnings between a small number of superstars and remaining 
artists. In a celebrated article, Sherwin Rosen (1981) showed that goods that are intensive in 
an innate input such as talent, combined with some characteristics such as scale economies 
arising from joint consumption, give rise to superstar markets; i.e., markets with a strong 
concentration of output and revenues on those few sellers who have the most talent. Several 
papers provide evidence of the strong (and increasing) concentration of sales in some artistic 
markets (see Rothenbuhler and Dimmick 1982, Crain and Tollison 2002, and Krueger 2005, 
among others). For example, in the case of rock and roll, Krueger (2005) reports that the top 
1% of artists obtained 26% of concert revenue in 1982. In 2003, this proportion rose to 56%. 
Similarly, the top 5% of revenue generators took in 62% of concert revenue in 1982 and 84% 
in 2003. There is also some solid evidence on the extremely skewed distribution of copyright 
yields across artists although data about earnings from copyrights are not easily accessible. 
For example, Kretschmer and Hardwick (2007) report data on the distribution of payments in 
1994 by the UK Performing Rights Society. This society distributed £20,350,000 among 
15,500 writers for the public performance and broadcasting of their works. The top 9.3% of 
                                                  
2 The need for a professional-career perspective in the analysis of the allocation of human resources is 
also important in some other markets. For example, having a large supply of good politicians and 
large-firm managers not only depends on paying them large sums at the peak of their careers but on 
developing the appropriate institutions and environment such that new potential talents can be tested, 
sorted, trained and promoted. Market failure arises as a consequence of the impossibility of insuring 
against the uncertainties of the professional career when talent is difficult to recognize ex ante. See 






writers earned 81.07% of the total. Ten composers earned more than £100,000, whereas 
53.1% of composers earned less than £100
3. The superstar character of artistic markets gen-
erates extraordinary uncertainty on young artists’ future revenues and has important conse-
quences for the optimal regulation of copyrights. 
The third feature of artistic markets emphasized in this paper is the important role 
played by promotion and marketing expenditures
4. In particular, the distribution of market 
shares between stars and young artists is largely affected by stars’ hefty expenditures on 
marketing their work, which in turn are affected by copyright regulations. 
The finding that copyright extensions could in the long run reduce artistic creation is 
in sharp contrast with some implications of the standard analysis of intellectual property. 
Note that, according to the standard analysis, the copyright regulation problem is to find an 
optimal compromise between the positive effect that stronger copyrights have on artistic 
creation and their negative underutilization effect (see Hirshleifer and Riley [1979], Novos 
and Waldman [1984], and the references therein). An exception is Landes and Posner 
(1989), who point out that excessively strong intellectual property rights may in fact hinder 
the development of new ideas that are based on previous ones. However, in spite of the thor-
oughness of this work, it also neglects the dynamic effects of copyright regulation on the 
expected value of artistic careers and does not account for the cited three characteristics of 
artistic markets that are central to our analysis. 
Our analysis is framed into an ovelapping-generations model of artists. Firstly, we 
consider a model with only two types of artists (talented and not-talented), which borrows 
important features from MacDonald (1988): artists start their careers as young artists whose 
talent is uncertain; only those that show talent after their first life-period continue the artistic 
career and become stars in their second (and last) life-period. Secondly, we generalize the 
results in a model with a continuum of talents. Although the mechanisms involved in these 
two models may seem different, the key condition for the main results is the same: the super-
                                                  
3 The data for the Spanish artistic market show an even higher degree of concentration: the top 1.5% 
of beneficiaries of the main collecting society in the country (SGAE) obtain 75% of total revenues 
(see AEVAL 2008). See also Chisholm (2004) for empirical work providing strong support to the 
hypothesis that stars obtain substantial economic rents in the motion picture industry. 
4 According to several sources cited by Peitz and Waelbroeck (2004), marketing and promotion are 






star effect must be important; i.e., a substantial share of market revenues accrues to a small 
fraction of superstars that obtain large rents. When this occurs, reinforcing copyrights may 
be negative for artistic creation and social welfare in the long run. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the general setting of the 
analysis. In section 3 we consider a model with two types of artists in terms of talent. We 
analyze the long-run consequences for artistic creation and social welfare of changes in the 
copyright term and progress in communication technologies favoring market concentration. 
In section 4, we build a model with a continuum of artist types. In addition to generalizing 
previous results, this model provides new insights on how, in the long run, copyright regula-
tion influences the average talent of senior artists. We summarize and conclude in section 5. 
Sections 6 and 7 provide some further generalizations and analytical details. 
2. General  Setting 
CONSIDER an economy with overlapping generations of potential artists who live for two 
periods. In each period, each potential artist may decide to be active as an artist, in which 
case she creates a single artistic good (such as a song, a novel, or a movie). If she decides to 
stay out of the artistic market, she earns an income 
Y F . Artistic goods are made available to 
consumers by means of copies, which are produced at a constant marginal cost c
5. Talent is 
heterogeneous and unknown to the public as well as to the artists themselves before they 
start the artistic career. There is free entry to the artistic market as an unknown artist. 
In this environment, MacDonald (1988) has analyzed how artists are sorted by 
the market through an information accumulation process. Assuming that future perform-
ance is correlated with past performance, MacDonald shows that individuals will enter 
the artistic career only when young (i.e., the first life period), and remain in the artistic 
market for the second period only if they receive a good review of their performance in 
                                                  
5 In this paper all copies are assumed to be produced and sold by the owner of the copyright in cases 
where the copyright has not expired yet. Thus, we do not consider issues related to piracy and file 
sharing. On these issues see Alcalá and González-Maestre (2010) who explore the consequences of 
unauthorized copying and levies on copy equipment in a model in which artistic firms use limit pric-
ing strategies. That model simplifies on a number of issues with respect to this one but introduces 






the first period. If this happens, their performances in their second life-period are at-
tended by a larger number of consumers who pay higher prices (i.e., they become super-
stars). In this paper we take advantage of these results to simplify some aspects of the 
model and concentrate on the consequences of the legal and economic environment for 
the long run dynamics of artistic creation. 
Following MacDonald’s (1988) results, we go on to assume that individuals entering 
the artistic profession do so in their first period of life. In case of entering the artistic market, 
they become young artists and create an artistic good. Only a fraction   of young artists are 
talented, but neither they nor artistic firms or the public can observe this innate characteristic 
until after the artist has completed her first life period. At the end of this first period, the 
fraction    of talented young artists reveals their talent and decide whether to continue the 
artistic career in the second life-period. In turn, the fraction 1    of young artists that reveal 
to be non-talented do not find it profitable to remain in the artistic market. Talented artists 
that continue the artistic career in the second period are called senior artists or superstars 
and are the only ones to benefit from costly marketing expenditures
6. Each of these senior 
artists creates a high-quality artistic good in her second life period. Since every artist creates 
one artistic good every period, per period (high-quality) artistic creation is equal to the num-
ber of active (senior) artists. 
2.1.  The artistic career: expected utility and constraints 










      
; where c1 and c2 are consumption at each life pe-
riod,   > 0   is the constant relative risk aversion coefficient, and  < 1   is the intertemporal 
discount factor, which is assumed to be equal to the interest rate. They compare the expected 
utility of starting and not starting an artistic career. As already indicated, we denote by 
Y F  
the per-period income earned by any individual outside the artistic market. Thus, the ex-
                                                  
6 This assumption can be motivated by fixed costs. Given the low probability of success, small fixed 
costs would lead promoting firms to stick with artists whose talent and charisma have already been 













    
. Alternatively, 



























t   is the earnings of a young artist at time t, 
S
t   is earnings of a senior artist, mt is 
the number of young artists at time t, and nt+1 is the number of stars one period later 
 1   tt nm   . Note that since the probability of having talent is the same for all potential 
young artists at the moment of deciding whether to start an artistic career, the probability of 
becoming a senior artist is the same for all of them and equal to the ratio  1/ tt nm  . Young 
artists that do not become stars after the first period drop out from the artistic market and 
earn 
Y F  in the second period. Free entry to the artistic career implies that the expected util-
















         
   (1) 
We will assume 
SY FF  . In fact, stars could have higher opportunity costs as a re-
sult of two circumstances. First, an individual that reveals to have talent in her fist period 
may have better outside options in the second life-period (since artistic talent may be posi-
tively correlated with other skills that are valuable in non-artistic occupations). And second, 
in order to create high-quality artistic goods it may be optimal to combine talented work with 
some other inputs that are more costly than those that are optimal to use by young-artist 
when creating their art. These additional inputs can be thought of being included in the op-
portunity cost 
S F  of stars’ artistic creations
8. 
                                                  
7 In line with the analysis in Terviö (2009), we assume young artists cannot obtain insurance for the 
eventuality that they do not become stars and cannot borrow against future expected income. 
8 The financial importance of these inputs may greatly vary across artistic activities. For example, 






High-type artistic creation requires the stars’ revenues to be at least as large as their 
opportunity costs: 
SS
t F   . In equilibrium, this constraint may be slack; that is, superstars 
may obtain economic rents. The reason is that there is not free entry in the artistic market as 
a superstar but the number of superstars in a given period is limited by the number of tal-
ented young artists that entered the artistic market in the previous period. In fact, according 
to the evidence cited in the Introduction, stars seem to obtain large rents. Hence, we assume 
throughout sections 2 and 3 that 
SS
t F   . Then, all the young artists that show talent in a 
given period become stars the next period:  
 
1 = tt nm         (2) 
 
In section 6 (appendix A) we also consider and discuss the case in which 
SS
t F    is bind-
ing, in which case we could have  1 = tt nm   .  
2.2.  Demand and competition in artistic markets 
There is a continuum of consumers Z each one buying a copy of an artistic work 
each period. A fraction a of consumers buys copies from superstars whereas the remaining 
fraction  1 a   buys from new young artists. The fraction a is endogenously determined as 
a function of the superstars’ advertising and marketing expenditures. Specifically, we assume 
  =  aa A , where 
=1
n
i i A A   and  0 i A   is star i’s advertising and marketing expendi-
tures. Horizontal differentiation within each sub-market is modeled following Salop (1979). 
That is, consumers are uniformly distributed in each sub-market along a circular space of 
preferences that has length one. Artists competing in each sub-market are located symmetri-
cally around that circle. The consumer located at distance z from her closest artist obtains 
utility 
  
 ; ;    =  ii i i UQPz Q p z       (3) 
                                                                                                                                        
may involve little more than the writers’ time. Still, we do not carry out an explicit analysis on the 
possible complementarities between talented artistic work and other more expensive inputs because 
this would add little to the analysis but some tedious algebra. Note however that our arguments below 






where Qi is the quality of artist i’s creation, pi is its price, and   is the consumer unit trans-
port cost, which can be interpreted as the disutility associated with departing from her opti-
mal consumption location. As in Salop (1979) we assume that Qi is the same for all the art-
ists in the same sub-market. However, we allow for the possibility that young artists’ crea-
tion is of lower average quality than superstars’ work; i.e., we assume 
SY QQ  , where 
S Q  
and 
Y Q  are respectively the expected quality of stars’ and young artists’ work
9. To simplify 
the analysis we also assume that 
S Q  and 
Y Q  are large enough to ensure that in equilibrium 
all the consumers buy one copy of an artistic good. 
There is an open debate as to whether advertising is informative of merely persua-
sive. However, our results do not depend on the point of view in this respect. For instance, an 
interpretation of the model assigning a strong informative role to advertising is the follo-
wing. Assume 
S Q  is not only strictly higher than 
Y Q  but the difference is sufficiently large 
so that any consumer would prefer to buy a star work instead of a low type (independently of 
their location in the circular space of characteristics) if she could recognize who are the stars. 
Star advertising and marketing is the mechanism informing who the talented artists are. 
Then, the fraction of consumers that is reached by stars’ advertising and marketing is given 
by a. Thus, this is the fraction buying stars’ work. An opposite interpretation of the model is 
to consider that stars do not really have more talent than the rest of artists; i.e.,   = 
SY QQ
10. 
In such a case, star advertising is not informative but persuasive and pushes a fraction a of 
consumers to buy star creations even if they are sold at significantly higher prices. Our quali-
tative results do not depend on whether we assume  > 
SY QQ  or  = 
SY QQ . The key point in 
the argument is not whether superstars are or not talented but whether they obtain rents
11. 
                                                  
9 We can take    =  1
YS QQ Q   , where Q  is the quality provided by a non-talented artist 
S QQ  . 
10 There is some controversy about whether it is necessary to be more talented in order to become a 
superstar. See Adler (1985) for some theory and Hamlen (1991) as well as Spierdijk and Voorneveld 
(2009) for empirical tests and references to additional analyses. 
11 Our setting can also be interpreted in a spatial way. Young artists may be thought to be local art-
ists, whereas stars are international artists. In each place, consumers buy the local artists’ output as 
well as the international artists’ (the local artists’ work may be thought to be more tied to the cultural 
peculiarities of a geographic area or ethnic group). Local artists become known by means of word-of-
mouth, whereas international artists rely on expensive marketing and promotion. The fraction of in-













        (4) 
 
where n is the number of senior artists    2 n  , and   and   are exogenous parameters 
 1 >   > 0,   > 1 . Thus, the stars’ market share would be equal to 1 if   =  A   and equal 
to  1      if  = 0 A . Note that the marketing expenditures that are necessary to obtain a 
given market share are proportional to market size Z
13. Parameter   determines how produc-
tive marketing expenditures are in gaining market share. This parameter may be thought to 
depend on the state of information, communication and reproduction technologies, as well as 
on the barriers to the globalization of culture
14. For example, when Alfred Marshall was call-
ing attention on the superstar phenomenon for the first time, the maximum audience that an 
opera superstar could reach was limited by the size of theatres. Now, a singer can potentially 
reach a worldwide audience at any time. Rosen (1981) pointed out the importance that radio 
and phonograph records had for the market of superstars and wondered about the changes 
                                                                                                                                        
period, a fraction of local artists reveals to have universal talent and is drafted by promotion firms to 
the international market. In this spatial interpretation, the model could be reformulated as with   
symmetric local sub-markets each one with size   1 aZ   . The international sub-market would still 
have size aZ  . 
12 Advertising and marketing of artistic goods are usually financed by artistic promotion firms. In this 
paper we consider each artist and her possible promotion firm as a single unit. Thus, we ignore the 
potential bargaining problems and conflicts of interest between artists and promotion firms, which 
have been analyzed elsewhere (see for example Gayer and Shy 2006). 
13 A firm’s advertising tends to increase both the demand for that firm’s good and the overall demand 
for the type of good being advertised. As a result, advertising increases the share of this type of good 
in consumers’ expenditure (Sutton 1991). In our formulation we model advertising as a public good 
for stars, ignoring the competitive effects of advertising within stars and focussing on the aggregate 
interactions between young artist and star sub-markets. Taking into account the competitive effects of 
advertising within stars would likely lead to more advertising by stars and to an even smaller market 
share for young artists. 
14 See the previous footnote for the interpretation of stars as international artists. A given expenditure 
in artistic promotion leads to larger stars’ international sales (and lower local artists’ sales) as eco-
nomic and political barriers to the international diffusion of culture are reduced. Lower barriers are 






that would be brought by new devices such as cable, video cassettes, and home computers. 
The path of technical progress affecting artistic markets does not seem to have slowed down 
in recent years thereby enhancing the ability to reach millions of consumers at lower costs 
and with increasing quality. The opening of frontiers to foreign cultural influences after the 
end of the cold world has also been spectacular. Comparative statics with respect to parame-
ter   will allow us to analyze the consequences for artistic creation of changes in the poten-
tial market that stars can reach and in the effectiveness of marketing techniques aimed at 
increasing stars’ market share
15. 
Within each period, we assume the following timing: 
  Stage 1: Each young artist that revealed to be talented in the previous period de-
cides whether to continue in the artistic market as a star. 
  Stage 2: Each star chooses simultaneously and independently her marketing ex-
penditure Ai. 
  Stage 3: Potential new young artists decide whether or not to enter the artistic 
market. 
  Stage 4: Each artist (young artists as well as stars) creates an artistic good and 
competes in prices with the rest of the artists in the same sub-market. At the end 
of this stage, young artists’ talent is revealed. 
3.  The Model with Two Artist Types 
IN this section we consider the simple case in which there are only two types of artists in 
terms of talent: talented and non-talented. This assumption helps to develop our arguments in 
a simple setting that incorporates the superstars feature: talent heterogeneity leads to a very 
high concentration of market share and revenues in a small fraction of artists. Moreover, we 
                                                  
15 Note that we are implicitly assuming that stars marketing expenditures A does not affect the total 
number of sales of artistic goods, Z. However, it could be argued that they tend to have a positive 
effect on Z. Thus, the increase in the stars’ sales would come in part as a result of a shift of demand 
from young-artists’ work to stars’ work and in part as a result of an in increase in consumer expendi-
ture on artistic goods. However, there is no reason to expect that an increase in the stars’ marketing 






assume that the time discount factor   is zero. Under this strong assumption, the analysis 
delivers the main insights of the paper in the simplest possible way. In the last subsection we 
discuss the generalization of this analysis to the case  > 0  . The mathematics of this gener-
alization is brought to section 6 (appendix A). 
3.1. Equilibrium  with  short-lived artistic creations 
Before we introduce perdurable artistic creations and copyrights, the dynamics of the 
model are more easily presented by considering artistic creations that stay in the market for 
only one period. 
3.1.1.  The short-run number of young artists 
Let us solve the equilibrium in a given period taking the number of stars n as 
exogenous. Consider the Nash equilibrium (NE) at Stage 4. Following Salop’s (1979) 
standard calculations, the price and output per artist in the stars’ symmetric NE are 
=
S p nc    and  =
S x aZ n. Then, we can solve for stage 2 


















    (5) 
 
The first-order conditions for the Nash equilibrium of this second-stage stage game 
yield the equilibrium market share of stars a(n): 
 







       (6) 
                                                  
16 Consider the two artist i’s marginal consumers, zi, each on each side of the artist’s location, who are 
indifferent between buying from firm i or from each of its closest neighbors. They satisfy the follow-
ing condition   1
S
ii i p zp n z    , where p
S is the common price set by the rest of the artist 
at the symmetric NE of the price game. Thus, the demand function of artist i is given by 
  , 2
SS
ii i x pp p p n aZ      and artist i’s first-order condition of profit maximization 
yields, after using the symmetry condition 
S
i pp  , the expressions 
S pn c     and 






Note that n    is a necessary and sufficient condition for  0 i A   (which in turn 
guarantees  0
S
i   . This conditions can always be met for   large enough. Hence through-
out the paper it is assumed that the effectiveness of promotion expenditures is high enough 
(i.e.,   is large enough) for stars to be willing to spend a positive amount of money on pro-
motion. 
In turn, the Nash equilibrium in the young sub-market yields the following price and out-
put per artist: 
Y p mc     and    1
Y x aZm  . The equilibrium number of young artists 
 mn is then determined by the free entry condition (1), where we plug in  1 tt nm    (from 
(2)). Thus, assuming  0   , we have  
2 1 ; 1,...,











      (7) 
3.1.2.  The long run number of artists 
Using (2) in the steady state to substitute in (7) yields the long-run equilibrium num-
ber of stars: 
 
2






      (8) 
 
Recall that changes in the parameter   can be seen as capturing positive effects on 
the stars’ capacity to gain market share due to technological innovations, marketing im-
provements and reductions in cultural and political barriers. Historically, these changes have 
worked in favor of superstars. For example, theatre and live concerts in cities and small vi-
llages yielded their way to movies, TV shows, and recorded music in which superstars would 
thrive. More recent innovations such as the Internet could work in favor of the promotion 
and the diffusion of young artists work. Expression (8) shows that increases in   (which 
raise stars’ market share: see (6)) reduce the long-run number of stars n*. Moreover, a reduc-
tion in n* also implies a reduction in the long-run number of young artists because 






Proposition (1). If stars obtain economic rents, then technological and social innova-
tions that favor market concentration (as those captured by increases in  ) reduce 
artistic creation in the long run. 
Intuitively, increases in stars’ market share leaves little audience for young artists, 
thereby reducing its number. As a result, fewer new talents are discovered, which in turn 
reduces the number of talented artists and high-quality artistic creation in the long run. 
3.2.  Long-lived creations and copyrights 
We now explicitly introduce copyrights in the model. Young artists’ work does not 
usually last for long in the market, whereas superstars’ records, movies, and books find bu-
yers for a long period after creation even if sales decrease over time
17. We will assume that 
young artists’ works are sold only during the period in which they are created, whereas stars’ 
works maintain positive market shares after the period of creation. These market shares de-
crease over time according to a discount factor  ,0 1     . Stars are assumed to be able to 
capture the present discounted value of the net yields from future sales by selling the copy-
rights when they are still alive. 
As before, there is a continuum of consumers Z each buying one copy of an artistic 
good in each period. A fraction    1 a    prefers to buy contemporaneous artistic creations, 
whereas a fraction   1 a     prefers creations from the last period and, in general, a frac-
tion   1 a





   

   is the fraction of consumers that buy young artists’ work in the cur-




  , where  A   is the amount spent in the 
promotion of senior artistic goods created   periods ago (which was invested at the time of 
                                                  
17 Liebowitz (2007) provides some illustrative numbers on the decay of record sales in the UK by date 
of production. The percentage of albums sales in 2004 by year of production was: 60.9% albums of 
the 2000s, 12.3% albums from the 1990s, 11% from the 1980s, 9.5% from the 1970s, 4.8% from the 
1960s, and 1.3% from the 1950s. Moreover, Kretschmer et al. (2008) provide evidence on the concen-






the good release, i.e.,   periods ago). We assume that    11 1 2     to insure that 
stars always fare better than young artists. 
Consumers buying work from each vintage as well as those buying from young ar-tists 
are distributed around a horizontal-differentiation circle of length one. Thus, the computation of 
prices and sales of stars’ work from each vintage is analogous to the one in the previous subsec-














 ; where n  is the number of stars that were active   
periods ago. Then, we can solve directly for the symmetric steady state equilibrium in which 
* *, , * t nn m m AA aa        . Each star’s present discounted value of future reve-






















     
  (9) 
 
where  1 T   is the length of the copyright term and  1 R   is the intertemporal discount 
factor. Maximizing with respect to marketing expenditures and using symmetry yields the 










   

    
  (10) 
 


















  . Below we give conditions guaran-
teeing    nT    in equilibrium, so that  0 i A  . Clearly,    T   is strictly increasing in 
T and R, and is bounded by 1  lim 1 if  1 T R     . With some abuse, below we consider 
 T   as a continuously differentiable function of T. Moreover, to simplify notation we use 
  and refer to it as the length of the copyright term. Substituting with (10) in (9) yields 











   


      
     (11) 
 
In turn, the fraction of consumers buying young artists’ work in the steady state is 





     . The NE in the young sub-market yields the same price and 
output per artist as in the previous subsections:    , 1 /
YY p mc x a Z m     . Hence, 




Y aZ m        (12) 
 
Therefore, using (1) and (2), which hold the same as in the previous subsection, as 









      (13) 
 
We thus have the following result: 
Proposition (2). If stars obtain rents then extending the length of the copyright term 
reduces the long run number of artists. 
Longer copyrights raise stars’ revenues, but this does not help increase the number 
of artists. The reason is that the constraint limiting the number of talented artists is that 
young artists’ market share is too small. This reduces the possibility to discover new talents. 
Extensions of the copyright term increase stars’ marketing expenditures and reduce young 
artists’ market share even more. This chokes the emergence of future talented artists. Note 
that this negative effect is in addition to the monopolistic distortions implied by copyrights, 
which lead to the underutilization problem. The result is conditional on stars obtaining rents. 
The references in the Introduction provide evidence in favor of this case. Analytically, it is 
shown in section 6 (appendix A) that if talent is sufficiently scarce in relative terms (i.e., if 






3.3. Social  welfare 
We have shown that longer copyrights may lead to fewer artists and less creation. Do 
fewer artists imply lower social welfare? Not necessarily. In fact, it is well-known that free 
entry may lead to an excessive number of firms in monopolistic competition markets (e.g., 
Salop 1979). If the benefits of wider product diversity are small relative to the fixed costs of 
having additional products, social welfare is maximized for a number of firms that is smaller 
than the number brought by monopolistic competition with free entry. A similar result holds 
in the model in this paper. However, if artistic variety has a sufficiently large value for con-
sumers or if talent is sufficiently scarce, then increasing the number of artists leads to higher 
social welfare. As a consequence, extensions of the copyright term that reduce the number of 
artists would be negative for social welfare. 




SY S Y W Q aZ a Q Z aZ a Z A cZ nF mF
nm
             
 (14) 
 
where the first term in square brackets is the consumers’ gross utility obtained from buying 
artistic goods, the second term is the costs (or disutility) of distance between the artists’ and 
the consumers’ locations, and the remaining terms are advertising, production and artists’ 
opportunity costs, respectively. We have the following result: 
Proposition (3). Assume that stars obtain rents and that the value of artistic diversity 
is sufficiently high (i.e.,   large) or talent is sufficiently scarce (i.e., low  ). Then, 
extending the length of the copyright term reduces social welfare in the long run. 
 
To explain this result, note that there are four welfare effects associated to a longer copy-
right. First, the gross utility of consumers increases as a greater stars’ marketing expenditure raises 
the fraction of people consuming stars’ output. This positive effect is conditional on stars’ output 
being of higher quality than the other artists’ output (i.e., 
SY QQ  ). Second, distance costs in-
crease (or equivalently, utility stemming from artistic variety decreases). This negative effects arises 
from the reduction in the number of both types of artists. Third, marketing costs A increase. And 
fourth, total opportunity costs 






value    of artistic variety is sufficiently high or the fraction   of talented artist is sufficiently 
small, the second and third effects outweigh the first and forth effects (see section 7 (appendix B) 
for the formal proof). 
Note that the key novel mechanism in our analysis of the link between copyrights 
and welfare is the negative impact that excessively strong copyrights can have on the long-
run number of artists, which was the result in the previous subsection. If the variety of high-
quality artistic creation is small and sufficiently valuable, then the number of artists and so-
cial welfare move in the same direction: the negative effect of longer copyrights on the num-
ber of artists outweighs, from the point of view of social welfare, the positive effect of grea-
ter informative advertising and lower total opportunity costs. 
There is another potential mechanism that increases the costs of excessively strong 
copyrights. This additional mechanism is the underutilization effect, which is the key effect 
limiting the optimal length of copyrights according to the standard analysis. It is due to the 
reduction in the use of already existing artistic goods that occurs if copyrights are extended. 
In our model, this effect is ignored because sales of artistic goods, Z, are constant and there-
fore inelastic to prices. However, longer copyrights imply higher prices and it is reasonable 
to think that sales would decrease with prices. Taking into account this underutilization ef-
fect would reinforce the potential negative impact of long copyrights on social welfare. 
3.4. Generalizations 
The analysis can be generalized to consider the case in which time discount factor   
is strictly positive. In this subsection, we only state and discuss the results. The mathematics 
are worked out in section 6 (appendix A). 
Stronger copyrights raise stars’ potential revenues and the incentives to invest in 
marketing their output, which in turn shifts consumer expenditure from the young artists’ 
work to the stars’. Thus, longer copyrights have two effects on the expected utility of starting 
the artistic career: a positive effect on future earnings in case of succeeding and becoming a 
star, and a negative effect on current actual returns as a young artist. If success has low pro-
bability and is coupled with risk aversion (specifically, if   is sufficiently small and relative 
risk aversion  12   ) or if future potential earnings as a star are heavily time-discounted 






nate and reduce the discounted expected utility of starting the artistic career
18,19. Thus, if stars 
obtain rents (so that there is no shortage of revenues constraining their creativity), copyright 
extensions would reduce artistic creation in the long run by hindering the process of develop-
ing and uncovering young talented artists. See proposition (8) in section 6 (appendix A), 
which generalizes proposition (2) to the case of strictly positive discount factors. 
How do structural changes in the relevant environment such as improvements in 
communication and marketing technologies (or reductions in the barriers to the globalization 
of culture) affect artistic creation in the long run? Results in proposition (1) are also extended 
in section 6 (appendix A). It is shown that if stars obtain rents and the probability of success 
as a star is sufficiently low (with  12   ) or the time discount factor is sufficiently small, 
improvements in communication and marketing technologies favoring market concentration 
by stars (as captured by increases in  ) reduce artistic creation in the long run. Moreover, 
the optimal copyright term from the point of view of maximizing artistic creation decreases 
with the effectiveness   of communication and marketing technologies (see propositions (9) 
and (10)). 
4.  A Continuum of Artist Types 
IN this section, we generalize the results in the previous section to a model with a continuum 
of artist types in terms of their talent. Furthermore, we also show that longer copyrights tend 
to lower the average talent of senior artists. Thus, in the long run, excessively long copy-
rights may reduce the total number of artists, their average talent and social welfare. The key 
condition for this to occur is that the superstar effect is sufficiently strong. In the model, this 
requires talent to be unevenly distributed across artists, so that there is a small fraction of 
artists with very high talent and that talent falls sharply as we consider additional artists from 
                                                  
18 This is consistent with the empirical analysis of Kretschmer and Hardwick (2007) who, after com-
paring the different sources of writers’ income in Germany and the UK and the skewness of copyright 
earnings, conclude that current copyright law may exacerbate risk. 
19 It may be argued that potential young artists are prompted to start the artistic career by the non-
pecuniary returns associated to the possibility of becoming a celebrity rather than by the discounted 
expected value of the artistic career. However, if these non-pecuniary returns are the key incentives 






a given pool. In other words, what is needed is a distribution of talent that somewhat ap-
proaches the previous case of a two-type distribution of talent. 
4.1. The  setting 
As in the previous sections, a fraction   of the most talented young artists of each 
generation continue active as stars in their second life-period. However,   is now en-
dogenous. Let q denote an artist talent and let q
M be the talent of the marginal senior artist; 
i.e., the talent of the least talented active senior artist. We assume that the distribution of 
talents is the same every generation of young artists (though the number of young artists 
may vary) and that the young artists that continue their careers as senior artists are the 
most talented of their generation. Therefore, the talent of the marginal senior artist is a 
decreasing function of the fraction of young artists continuing their careers. Denote this 
function as  
M q  . We assume the specific functional form    (1 )
M k qk e
 
  , where 
0 k  . The parameter k provides sufficient flexibility to discuss different configurations of 
the market:  0 k   would correspond to the case of homogeneous talent, whereas the larger 
k is, the more skewed the distribution is and the larger the difference of talent between 
superstars and modest artists. We refer to a larger k as a stronger superstar configuration 










        

. 
To simplify and fit the new continuous distribution of talent within the Salop (1979) 
framework, we assume that artistic talent translates into being quantitatively more creative. 
That is, an artist with talent q creates q artistic goods per period. The number of senior artis-
tic goods created each period is denoted by N. Thus, 
S Nn E q     . Moreover, we assume 
each artist locates and sells her artistic creations as if each one had been created by a differ-
ent artist. That is, each artistic creation is symmetrically located around the corresponding 
circle of characteristics (i.e., either around the stars’ circle or around the young artists’ circle) 
regardless of the author. This allows us to maintain the same symmetric monopolistic com-
petition framework with very few changes: the exogenous   is now substituted with the 






termining prices in the senior sub-market is not the number of senior artists n but the number 
of senior creations N. 
We directly go on to analyze the steady state. Thus, all the propositions below refer 
to the long run. In equilibrium, the fraction of young artists that continue active in the second 
period as senior artists is such that the marginal senior artist obtains no rents: 
 
 ,
M SS qN F        (15) 
 
where   ,
S N   is now interpreted as the discounted revenues per senior artistic good. 
Discounted revenues per senior artistic good are determined by the same expression (11) 













     (16) 
 
This continuous and increasing relationship between q
M and N over the interval 
  2 0,N    is represented in figure 1 as    ,
M M Nq . In turn, the new free entry condi-
tion as a young artist is
20: 
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  .  
 
                                                  
20 We are assuming that each young artist creates one artistic good. Instead, we could assume that talent differ-
ences lead to differeces in output already when artists are young. Returns during the period as a young artist 
would then be uncertain. Moreover,      1
Yk mEq m e
     would be the number of young-artist works in the 
market every period, which would determine their prices and revenues. The main consequence of this setting 
would be that uncertainty during the period as a young artist is larger, which in turn reduces the expected value of 
starting the artistic career. This is equivalent to considering an increase in F
Y. This setting would make the nota-
















   
  
     (17) 
 
This continuous and decreasing relationship between q
M and N over the interval [0, )   is 
represented in figure 1 as   ,
M YN q . Note that for    1
Y NN Z F    then   ,
M YN q  
implies  1
M q   whereas   ,
M M Nq  implies  1
M q  . 
 





















































Note: Extending the copyright term   shifts downwards both the M(N; q
M) and the Y (N; q
M) schedules. This reduces the marginal artist’s talent 
q
M. Furthermore, if the artistic market has a strong superstar configuration (large k), the shift in Y (N; q
M) dominates and reduces artistic creation 










4.2.  Copyrights and artistic creation 
The existence of long run equilibria with some degree of artistic diversity requires a 
positive market share for young artists   1   , some minimum copyright protection  , 
some minimum market size Z with respect to the size of the fixed opportunity costs F
Y, and 
some minimum consumer preference for artistic diversity  . If k is sufficiently large, then 
the following assumption is sufficient for the existence of an equilibrium with  *2 N   (and 
therefore, with 
SS F   ). This can be checked using figure 1
21. 
Assumption (1):  22 1
Y ZF        
Note that conditions in assumption (1) will continue to be met when we consider ar-
bitrarily large values of  , as we do in the next propositions. Expressions (16) and 














      
  (18) 
 
We then have the following results (see the proofs in section 7 [appendix B]). 
 
Proposition (4). If the artistic market has a sufficiently strong superstar configura-
tion (i.e., if k is sufficiently large), then there exists a finite copyright term T
N (i.e., 
there exists a  1
N   ) that maximizes artistic creation. Extending the length of the 
copyright term beyond that point reduces the number of young artists starting the ar-
tistic career and reduces artistic creation in the long run by both young and senior 
artists. Moreover, the stronger the superstar configuration of the market, the shorter 
the copyright term that maximizes artistic creation. 
                                                  
21  Consider figure 1. Assumption (1) and k suffciently large insure   1 2, , 1
M NM N q   for 
1 NN  , and 
21 0
MM qq  . Hence    ,
M M Nq  and    ,
M YN q  cross at N* such that 
1 2* NN   
(also note that 






Proposition (5). Extending the length of the copyright term increases the fraction of 
young artists that become senior artists, which involves a reduction in the average 
talent of senior artists. 
When copyrights are extended, young artists that were slightly short of having 
enough talent to break even as senior artists are then able to cover opportunity costs F
S. 
However, the absolute number of young artists as well as senior creation may be reduced in 
the long run as a result of copyright extensions even if a larger fraction of young artists suc-
ceed. The intuition is as follows: if the copyright term is extended, senior artists invest more 
in marketing. This reduces the size of the young artists sub-market and therefore the number 
of young artists that are able to start the artistic career. As a result, the new generation of 
young artists provides a smaller pool of talent for the next generation of senior artists. The 
shortage of new highly-talented senior artists is partially compensated by a higher fraction of 
young artists continuing their careers as senior artists. This can also be seen as increasing the 
fraction of mediocre senior artists. In any case, senior artistic creation is reduced. 
Graphically, an increase in   shifts downwards both the   ,
M YN q  and the 
 ,
M M Nq  schedules in figure 1 (recall assumption (1) implies  1    ). Given  , if k 
is large then the shift in   ,
M YN q  tends dominate, thereby reducing N*. Then, given k, if 
  is sufficiently small then the downward shift of    ,
M M Nq  dominates and implies a 
new equilibrium with larger N*. In between those copyright terms, there is a value 
N  , 
01
N     , that maximizes N* (see section 7 [appendix B] for the proof). 
To see the implication on the number of young artists, note that 
[] ( 1 )
Sk Nn E q m e
     . Hence a lower N and a larger   imply a lower m. Thus, if 
talent is sufficiently heterogeneous, the number of young artists that start the artistic career 
decreases with copyrights, even if a larger fraction of them are able to continue in the market 
as senior artists. The combination of a smaller entry of young artists and a larger fraction of 
them continuing as senior artist could result in larger artistic creation if talent were evenly 
distributed among artists (i.e., if k were low)
22. However, the larger the parameter k is, the 
                                                  











lower the creativity of the marginal senior artist. As a consequence, if k is sufficiently large, 
the negative effect that greater copyrights have on artistic creation due to a lower entry of 
young artists outweighs the positive effect due to a higher fraction of young artists conti-
nuing as senior artists
23. 
The mechanism can also be viewed from the perspective of how additional revenues 
in the artistic industry are allocated across artists. As k tends to 0, the difference in talent 
between the most talented artists and the marginal artist goes to zero. Therefore, superstar 
rents would also tend to zero. If this is the case, the additional revenues accruing to the artis-
tic industry as a result of an extension of copyrights go to help more young artists to continue 
their career as senior artists: the talent cutoff determining the marginal senior artist decrea-
ses, thereby inducing young artists that were to drop out from the artistic market to continue 
their careers. The flatter is the distribution of talent, the larger would be the number of these 
additional senior artists
24. In contrast, if talent is very unevenly distributed, most additional 
revenues accruing to the artistic industry that result from a reinforcement of copyrights go to 
increase the superstars’ rents. This does not help artistic creation. 
Proposition (5) implies that an excessive concentration of revenues in the artistic 
market can harm artistic creation in the long run, even if one of the causes of this concen-
tration were an exogenously large heterogeneity of talent. If this is the case, shortening the 
co-pyright term can reduce the concentration of sales and revenues, help discover new 
                                                                                                                                        
of promotion expenditures is very low; i.e., if k or   is equal to 0 (see expression (25) in section 7 
[appendix B]). Note if k and   tend to zero, then all the three key features of the model disappear: all 
artists within a given generation are alike, there is no difference between young and senior artists 
either (everybody has the same expected talent), and marketing expenditures do not play any informa-
tive or persuasive role. This makes clear that all the three distinctive features of our model emphasized 






23 If the second-period expected returns of young artists are taken into account, then increases in su-
perstar rents have a less negative impact on young artist’s decissions to start the artistic career. But 
again, if uncertainty and risk aversion are sufficiently large or if the discount factor is sufficiently low, 
the same qualitative results hold as shown in section 6 (appendix A) for the model with two artist 
types. 





 is decreasing in k, as can be seen using expressions (25) and (26) in section 






talents, and raise creation in the long run. Finally, note that the two-type model in the pre-
vious section with small   can be viewed as a limit case of this continuum of types model 
with large k. 
4.3. Social  welfare 
What are the potential welfare consequences of extending the copyright term in this 
setting? How does the optimal copyright term depend on the structure of the market? Wel-
fare is given by the same expression (14) above. Results are then similar to those found in 
the framework of the two-type model (see the proof in section 7 [appendix B]). 
Proposition (6). If artistic diversity is sufficiently valuable to consumers (i.e., if   is 
sufficiently large) and artistic markets have a sufficiently strong superstar configura-
tion (i.e., if k is sufficiently large), then there is an optimal copyright term 
W   that 
maximizes long run social welfare. Extending copyrights beyond that term reduces 
social welfare due to a negative impact on artistic creation. Moreover, the stronger 
the superstar configuration of the market, the shorter optimal copyrights are. 
Conceptually, the derivative in the model with a continuum of types has the same 
four components than in the two-type model, and the intuition for the results in the proposi-
tion is analogous. First, a larger copyright raises the gross utility of consumers as the fraction 
of people consuming stars’ output increases. Again, this positive effect is conditional on 
stars’ output being of higher quality than the other artists’ output. Second, utility stemming 
from artistic variety decreases. Third, marketing costs increase. And fourth, total opportunity 
costs are reduced as the number of artists decreases. If artistic diversity   is sufficiently 
valuable, the second and third effects eventually outweigh the first and forth effects. More-
over, the more valuable artistic diversity, the closer 
W   is to 
N   (i.e., the closer the copy-
right term that maximizes welfare is to the one that maximizes artistic creation). This seems 
intuitive because as   becomes large then only the second effect tends to matter. 
The empirical counterpart of a high k is a high concentration of sales and revenues 
by a group of superstars. Thus, if artistic diversity is indeed highly valuable, the last proposi-
tion in combination with the evidence indicating that concentration of sales and revenues in 
artistic markets is high and increasing would suggest that the length of the copyright term 






has been increased periodically over time. Does this involve a contradiction between the 
analysis in this paper and the facts? To explain the trend towards longer copyrights it is more 
appropriate to refer to the political economy of copyright regulation than to refer to the nor-
mative economics of optimal copyrights. In this respect, note that the value of an extension 
of the copyright term for a copyright holder increases as communication and marketing tech-
nologies improve and as the market for artistic goods expands and becomes more global 
(note that the stars’ revenues increase with   and Z). Even more, copyright extensions for 
artistic goods that were created in the past are even more lucrative for copyright holders be-
cause the main costs or creating and promoting the good were already paid
25. Hence, over 
time, we can expect increasing lobbying by copyright holders in favor of copyright exten-
sions. 
5. Concluding  Comments 
ARTISTIC talent and charisma are unequally distributed across individuals and are difficult 
to assess. Talent is sorted and developed by having potentially talented artists start artistic 
careers that most often end in failure. Understanding the long run consequences of copyright 
regulation for artistic creation requires understanding how this regulation affects young ar-
tists’ incentives to start the artistic career. The contribution of this paper is to provide a pro-
fessional-career perspective to the analysis of optimal copyright regulation that accounts for 
the superstar character of artistic markets. Such a perspective provides new insights that 
complement the existing analyses. The paper shows that, in the long run, excessively long 
copyrights can lead to a really bad situation in terms of creativity and talent: they can reduce 
young and senior artistic creation while increasing the proportion of mediocrities within the 
group of senior artists. If artistic diversity is sufficiently valuable to consumers and the artis-
tic market has a strong superstar configuration, those effects reduce social welfare. 
There are several mechanisms at work in our results. Increases in superstar reve-
nues can have no impact on the expected value of young artists’ careers or can even have 
                                                  
25 It has been suggested that the main beneficiaries from the proposed extension of the copyright term 
in the European Union would be the «shareholders of four major multinational companies that control 
the valuable recordings of the 1960s (Universal, Warner, Sony and EMI)». See Kretschmer et al. 






a negative one. Most artistic markets operate in the framework of an overwhelming ma-
chinery of promotion and advertising. Raising the superstars’ potential for revenues (as 
by extending the copyright’s term) increases the profitability of marketing their work. 
This reduces young artists’ market share and may reduce their absolute number even if 
total revenues accruing to the industry rise. Hence, stronger copyrights may result in an 
increase in superstar earnings but in fewer young artists starting the artistic career, which 
leads to lower average talent and less artistic creation in the long run. 
The optimal length of the copyright term decreases with the degree of market 
concentration by superstars. The stronger the superstar configuration of artistic markets, 
the more uncertain artistic careers are, the larger the share of additional revenues created 
by extensions of the copyright term that will accrue to superstars, and the more likely 
that these extensions will reduce young artists’ economic opportunities to start the artis-
tic career. Co-pyright regulation cannot affect the uneven distribution of talents, which is 
the underlying reason for the superstar character of artistic markets. But it can affect how 
the distribution of talents translates into a distribution of revenues. Increasing the alloca-
tion of financial resources towards superstar rents, which are highly discounted by time 
and risk as components of the expected value of an artistic career, may be wasteful and 
even counterproductive as a way to promote artistic creation. Policies directly aiming at 
increasing young artists’ opportunities to have an audience and to test their skills may be 
more effective in promoting talent and artistic creation than increasing superstar reve-
nues. 
The analysis has a number of implications for other related issues. Copyrights 
should be adapted to changes in the technological and economic environment. For more 
than a century, technological and institutional changes have favored market concentration 
by super-stars. This paper suggests that copyrights should have been shortened in that sce-
nario. Instead, most countries kept extending copyrights, which could be explained in 
terms of the greater incentives for lobbying in favor of copyright extensions that larger 
superstar rents create. More recent technological, political, and cultural changes are having 
mixed consequences on superstars’ market share. New copying and communication tech-
nologies such as the Internet seem to be working against concentration, whereas changes in 
the economic and political environment have facilitated the globalization of culture, which 






ing should be an important key in determining the direction in which copyright regulation 
should be adjusted. 
6.  Appendix A: The Model with Positive Discount Factor 
IN this appendix, we generalize the analysis to a positive intertemporal discount factor (i.e., 
0   ) and consider the possible implications of stars' constraint 
SS
t F   . The analysis of 
senior artists' optimal decisions carried out in section 3 remains unchanged. To save nota-
tion, in this section we assume  1   . We go on to directly to consider the symmetric steady 
state equilibrium of the model. 
6.1.  A graphical exposition 
If stars' opportunity cost is binding, additional active stars would bring their earnings 
below their opportunity costs. Hence, it may happen that young artists that reveal their talent 
in their first life-period do not become stars in their second life-period. To the contrary, if 
superstars’ earnings are strictly above their opportunity costs, all young artists that show ta-
lent will want to stay in the artistic market in their second life-period as senior artists. These 
arguments are summarized in the following constraint: 
 
1; tt nm          ( 1 9 )  
  1 0
SS
tt t Fn m      
Depending on whether or not the constraint  1 tt nm     is binding, we use 
1 t t nm    or 
SS
t F     to substitute in expression (1) to determine the equilibrium. 
In sum, the number of superstars is limited by either the revenue that these artists obtain 
(which must be at least as large as their opportunity costs), or by the inflow of new talented young 
artists (which in turn depends on the life-long expected utility of starting the artistic career). The 
long run consequences for artistic creation of changes in copyright regulation and marketing tech-






The   , Sn   locus 
Consider the pairs of   and n that satisfy constraint 
SS
t F    with equality; i.e., the 
combinations of copyrights and number of stars leading to a stars' income level equal to their 
opportunity costs. We denote this locus by    , Sn  : 
   ,:, : ,
SS Sn n nF          (20) 
where   ,
S n   is given by (11). Hence, differentiating    , Sn   with respect to n and   
yields  1/
0









 (note that  () 1 0 an n   ). Therefore 
 , Sn   has a positive slope as shown in figure 2. Intuitively, a longer copyright term increases 
stars' revenues thereby allowing stars to cover their opportunity costs even if the number of stars 
is larger (i.e., even if there is more competition and prices of artistic goods are lower). It is useful 
to define  : s RR   as the function that for each   yields the value of n that satisfies (20). Note 
that a pair   ,n   satisfies constraint 
SS
t F    if and only if   () ns   . 













Note: Stars’ income is equal (or higher) than their opportunity costs for points in (or below)    , Sn  . Young artists’ expected discounted 
returns of starting the artistic career are equal (or higher) than their opportunity costs for points in (or below)   , Yn  . This schedule has a 
negative slope as long as the probability of succeeding as a star is low or the career to become a star is long. The solid line shows the long-run 
number of stars as a function of the length of the copyright term. The copyright term 






The   , Yn   locus 















               
   (21) 
Now, consider the combinations of   and n satisfying this expression and constraint 
(19) with equality; i.e., the combinations of   and n providing an expected discounted reve-
nue of starting the artistic career equal to opportunity costs when all talented young artists 
will be willing to continue their career as stars. We denote this locus by   , Yn  , which 
after using (10) is given by: 
 
   
1 1 2







   
     
 
                 
 (22) 
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  . Note that the product 










 are bounded 
from above by Z. Hence, if there is a sufficiently small probability   of becoming a star 
(assuming  12    ) or if the time needed to grow and emerge as a talented artist is suffi-
ciently long (which implies a small discount factor  ), then  dn d   is negative. Both cir-
cumstances seem to characterize artistic markets as argued in the Introduction, which moti-
vates assumption (2) below. Under this assumption, the    , Yn   locus has a negative slope 
as shown in figure 2. Intuitively, longer copyrights increase stars' revenues, marketing, and 
market share. As a consequence, they reduce the number of young artists that can cover their 






mined by the number of young artists that start the career and have talent (i.e., a fraction  ). 
Therefore, n is decreasing in  . It is useful to define  : y RR   using   , Yn  , as the 
function that for each   yields the value of n that satisfies (22). Note that a pair  ,n   
satisfies constraint (19) if and only if    ny   . 
Now, define   as the copyright satisfying    ,2
SS F    and n1 as the number of 
senior artists satisfying   1 , Yn  . Note that if   is sufficiently large, then 01    (also 
n   , which guarantees  0 A  ), and that if Z is sufficiently large then  1 2 n  . See fi-
gure 2. In turn, define n2 as the n satisfying    2 1, Yn , and define n3 as the n satisfying 
 3 1, Sn . Note that we always have  3 2 n   and that for   sufficiently low, we also have 
2 2 n  . Hence for   sufficiently low, we have  32 nn  . These circumstances together 
would guarantee that   , Yn   and    , Sn   cross each other for some   ,1
n    . Hence 
we have the following: 
Proposition (7). If the probability of success as a star   is sufficiently small and 
relative risk aversion   is larger than 12, and if marketing efficiency   and mar-
ket size Z are sufficiently large, then the long-run equilibrium number of senior ar-
tists n* satisfies  *2 n  . Moreover, it is given as a function of the length of the 
copyright term by      *m i n , ny s         and there exists   ,1
n     that maxi-
mizes n*. 
Proof. Pairs  ,n   on or below the locus    , Sn   in figure 2 satisfy constraint 
SS
t F   , whereas pairs on or below    , Yn   satisfy (1) and constraint (19). Thus, using 
 s   and   y   we can determine the long-run equilibrium number of senior artists n* as 
  *m i n , ny s      . Then, recall that if the probability of success as a star   is suffi-
ciently small and if  12   , then we have  0 dn d   in schedule   , Yn   and that 
32 nn  . And, also, that if   is sufficiently large, then  1   , whereas if market size Z is 
sufficiently large, then we have  1 2 n  . This implies that for some   ,1
n    ,   , Yn   
and   , Sn   cross each other. Then, the positive slope of    , Sn   and the negative slope of  
 , Yn   within the interval   ,1   imply that the long number of senior artists is maximized 
for this copyright term 
n  . 
The assumption with the most important conceptual content in this proposition is 






that revenues in artistic markets are very uncertain and unevenly distributed. This is analo-
gous to the assumption in the continuous-type model requiring that markets have a superstar 
configuration that is sufficiently strong. If earnings were homogeneous across artists, longer 
copyrights would always stimulate artistic creation according to this model. The other as-
sumptions have a more technical nature. Marketing expenditures must be sufficiently effec-
tive for them to be non-negative. This requires   being sufficiently large. Then, the fact that 
artists have some fixed opportunity cost implies that market size Z has to be sufficiently 
large for the number of artists to be at least 2.  
Solid lines in figure 2 indicate the segments of    y   and    s   that determine n*. 
Note that if senior artists obtain revenues above their opportunity costs then   y   is the 
relevant schedule determining n*. The following corollary is then immediate: 
Corollary (8). Let assumption (2) hold. If stars obtain rents, then extending the copy-
right length reduces artistic creation in the long run. Otherwise, it increases artistic 
creation. 
6.2. Technological  innovations and market expansions 
Now we consider how structural changes in the relevant environment affect artistic 
creation in the long run. The effect depends on whether the relevant constraint for artistic 
careers is the   , Sn   locus or the    , Yn   one. An increase in market size Z shifts both 
schedules upwards, so that n increases regardless of  . In turn, an increase in  shifts the 
 , Yn   schedule downwards and the    , Sn   schedule upwards (see figure 3, where 
21    ). Therefore, the impact of   on n depends on  . If   is to the right of  1
n   (i.e., if 
stars obtain rents), then an increase of   leads to a reduction of n. These results are summa-
rized in the following proposition. 
Proposition (9). Increases in market size always increase artistic creation in the long 
run, regardless of the copyright term. In turn, under assumption (2) and if stars ob-
tain rents, improvements in communication and marketing technologies favoring 
market concentration by stars (i.e., increases in  ) reduce artistic creation in the 
long run.   
 




















Note: Improvements in communication and marketing technologies as well as reductions in the barriers to the globalization of culture are captured 
by increases in  . They shift upwards the  (, ) Sn  schedule and downwards the  (, ) Yn  schedule. The solid lines show the long-run 
number of stars n as a function of the copyright term  . Increases in   reduce the copyright term 
n   that maximizes the number of stars (the 
talented senior artists). 
 
Proof. We have to show that when   increases the    , Sn   schedule shifts up-
wards whereas the   , Yn   schedule shifts downwards; and that when Z increases, both 
schedules shift upwards. The directions of the shifts can be obtained by differentiating n with 
respect to   and Z in   , Yn   and    , Sn  , while taking   as a constant. To analyze the 































          




S be the level of n implied by    , Sn  . Differentiating    , Sn   with respect to n and 
Z, and with respect to n and   yields, respectively: 
 
0; 0
SS SS SS dn dn
Zn n dZ d
 
 
   
         
 
 
Therefore, the schedule    , Sn   shifts upwards when Z or  increase. Now, let n
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gn dn Z Z







































Note that we always have  2 n  , that the product 















 are bounded from above by Z, and that 
S   is bounded from below by 
S F . Hence, 
assuming  12   , if   or   is sufficiently small, then 
Y dn dZ  is positive whereas 
Y dn d  is negative. Therefore, if Z (respectively,  ) increases, then the schedule   , Yn   






 , whereas the impact of   depends on  . If   is to the right of  1
n   (i.e., if stars obtain 
rents), then an increase of   leads to a reduction of n. See figure 3. 
How should the copyright term be changed as the economic environment changes? It 
is clear from figure 2 that if the    , Sn   and    , Yn   schedules cross for some copyright 
term  0
n   , this is the term maximizing long-run artistic creation. We can thus use this 
graphical analysis to investigate how the maximizing copyright term changes as a result of 
changes in the economy. It is easy to check using figure 3 that an increase in   always leads 
to a shorter optimal term 
n  . 
Proposition (10). Improvements in communication and marketing technologies as 
well as reductions in the barriers to the globalization of culture (as captured by in-
creases in  ) shorten the length of the copyright term that maximizes long-run artis-
tic creation. 
7. Appendix  B 
7.1.  Proof of Proposition (3) 
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 
. This derivative is negative if   is suffi-






7.2.  Proof of Proposition (4) 
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If k is sufficiently large, then this derivative is positive for short copyrights and negative for 
long ones, which implies the potential negative effect of the extension of copyrights on artis-
tic creation stated in proposition (4). Note that if assumption (1) holds, in equilibrium we 
have  0


















. Substitute with N = 0 in (15) and 
(17), and define   as the copyright solving    ,0
SS kF   . This is a lower bound for 
the copyright term: below this level, no senior artist would be able to pay for her opportunity 
costs 
S F . As   approaches   from above, (15)-(17) yield that N tends to 0,
SS kF    
tends to 1, and therefore the derivative in (25) is positive. 
In turn, for any  ,1    , if k is sufficiently large then expression (25) is nega-
tive. To see this note that N* is bounded from above by 
Y Z F   and from below by 2 (see 
figure 1). Hence, (11) and assumption (1) imply that 
S   is bounded from below above zero 
and that 
S     is bounded from above. Therefore, for k sufficiently large, there is a copy-
right term  ,1





  and N* is maximized. 




 , note first that in a neighborhood of the maximizer 
N   
we have 










 ) in that neighborhood. Using (25) note that the sign of  N   in a small neighbor-
hood of 
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. In turn, implicit 









    
. Recall that 
S   is 













  . Moreover, for k sufficiently large we have  0
dH
dk





  in a neighborhood of 
N  .    
7.3.  Proof of Proposition (5) 
Note from (25) that we always have  1 N   . Then, taking into account that 
M k qk e
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             
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  (which is negative for k sufficiently large: Proposition (5) and 

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   

. Note first that for   sufficiently close to 
zero the above expression would be positive (as long as assumption (1) still holds). How-
ever, given a copyright term 01   , for   and k sufficiently large this derivative be-
comes negative. To see this recall that  1 N   , N is bounded  
Y NZ F       as 





 . Hence there is a 
copyright term  ,0 1
WN   , that maximizes social welfare. 
Now, as the value of artistic diversity   increases, the copyright that maximizes so-
cial welfare 
W   becomes arbitrarily close to the one that maximizes senior artistic creation 















N  , which is the copyright such that  0 N   . Thus, we have the following cross-
derivative evaluated at 
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Therefore we conclude that the optimal copyright term is shorter in markets where k 
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